The peculiarity of Herman Melville's great, enigmatic creation Bartleby derives from his unique lack of engagement-a lack that is in no way simply a refusal-exempli fied by his formula "I would prefer not to."1 Much has been written about Bartleby, and Giorgio Agamben's conception of him as a figure of contingency of potentiality maintained in radical passivity,2 is perhaps the most suggestive and pregnant for a thinking of the relation of the ethical to the political. By putting action in suspension through a maintenance of potentiality, "I would prefer not to" as the"restitutio in inte grum of possibility, which keeps possibility suspended between occurrence and Bartleby's minimal formula should be understood as a form of silence. But the quiet of the "silent man," as Bartleby's fellow inmates dub him (670), cannot sim ply be understood as reticence. It is an indeterminate suspension of response that has the metalinguistic consequence of drawing attention to the discourse and to its practical as well as ethico-political presuppositions, one might say a (mute) "speech act" of passivity, whose illocutionary effect is a radical suspension of the conditions of response. Within Agamben's broader concerns, this potentiality does not simply indicate the social placement of any given discourse, but relates to the human con dition of language itself. In the preface to the French translation of his 1978 Infanzia e storia, Agamben delineates the contents of an unwritten book on the human voice and describes a fundamental experimentum linguae, an experience of language itself, of the thing of language (an experiment prepared by the Saussurean revolution in linguistics, as refined by Emile Benveniste and in a different way Roman Jakobson, and its reverberations in poststructuralist thought of the period, but an experiment also always implicit in the experience of poetry, broadly defined). There is no fun damental human voice, Agamben suggests, that is subsequently articulated by the letter, by grammar, into human speech. Voice-the mute, meaningful precondi tion of language assumed by the metaphysical tradition, by Martin Heidegger as well as G. W E Hegel-is an illusion (explored in the 1982 Language and Death).
There is no ineffable silence or meaningful voice before language, merely the pre suppositional fact of language as such (always entered, as Claude Levi-Strauss argued, as a synchronic totality), which is experienced in the experimentum, through shifters, through rhetoric, through that which draws attention to the arti ficiality, conventionality, and nonreferentiality of language as a system.
[T]here is no arthros, no articulation between phone and logos . . . The space between voice and logos is an empty space, a limit in the Kantian sense. Only because man finds himself cast into language without the vehicle of a voice, and only because the experimentum linguae lures him, grammarless, into that void and that aphonia, do an ethos and a com munity of any kind become possible.4
So our very being, as animals without voice, cast into language, has radical impli cations for ethics and politics.
Bartleby's silence is another invitation to this experiment. And it is very dis ruptive, as it shuts down the regular, smooth functioning of social speech. Robert is a family man who worked as a laborer on a sheep farm for twelve years but was "let go" by his boss without warning or compensation to be replaced by a younger, cheaper, single man, and then picked up as an unemployed vagrant on the very road out of the farm. He is well aware that the camps exist not as social services of a welfare state but as services for the landowners, providing cheap, short-term "contract" labor rather than long-term jobs with the benefits that make a decent life possible. He acts as a would-be educator of K in political mat ters, commenting that the society needs and indeed wants the camps to exist, but requires that they be out of sight for the sake of seemliness and good conscience. [who] doesn't know how to strike a match" (131); he is "otherworldly" (130; 142);28 he fears a vengeful mother (150), and is useless in this world, a "mistake" Then, after a few unsatisfying sentences that are extracted with great difficulty and that in no way add up to the desired resistance narrative, K falls silent: "There was a silence so dense that I heard it as a ringing in my ears, a silence of the kind one experiences in mine shafts, cellars, bomb shelters, airless places" (140). The silence completely exasperates the medical officer and brings an end to the inter rogation. But the officer is stuck in anger and frustration and does not begin to think the meaning of this silence.31
An influential, negative interpretation of K's silence is offered rather forcefully by Benita Parry: "My hypothesis about Coetzee's figures of silence ... is that although they are disentitled, and are therefore available to be read as manifesting subordi nation to, and retreat from, a subjugated condition, the potential critique of politi cal oppression is diverted by the conjuring and endorsing of a non-verbal signifying system," which she describes as "mystic consciousness" or a "transcendent state."32
Ultimately, combined with an abstracting away of the landscape and the particular cultural marks of the specific setting, the gesture "dissipates the engagement with political conditions it also inscribes."33 So Coetzee is implicated, despite his con There is some textual evidence outside of the officer's narrati of K as "escape artist," however unheroic. The first outcome of the experimentum linguae, therefore, is a radical revision of the very idea of Community. The only content of the experi mentum is that there is language, we cannot represent this, by the domi nant model in our culture, as a language, as a state or a patrimony of names and rules which each people transmit from generation to gener ation. It is, rather, the unpresupposable non-latency in which men have always dwelt, and in which, speaking, they move and breathe.51
Like Bartleby, by drawing attention to language as such, K begs this insight. But this experience of silence, this rediscovery of infancy, with all of its experiential poten tiality, is also a removal from the Aristotelian sphere of justice itself.52 At question is the very limit of justice at the limit of the human, a topic that is increasingly of inter est to Coetzee. grace, but it is clear that Michael K poses this incompatibility or discontinuity at the same time as it rhetorically "tames" or unites the spheres in a fictionally complex way. K is a figure of the ethical that resists the will to knowledge (however writerly) of the colonial representative as it resists subsumption into a properly political struggle (K does not join the guerrillas).55 As such, as irrecuperable, K figures one of Coetzee's most important points: how the ethical must "norm" the political and never simply, beforehand, be prejudged, understood, and added to the calcula tion.56 Indeed K is perhaps the most convincing exploration of this problematic in Coetzee's oeuvre, and as such is a valuable example of that "nestling" that charac terizes great writing. According to certain aesthetic criteria (underlying negative criticism in the 1980s and '90s), the book is more problematic than productive. But as Agamben suggests, in this respect in agreement with as different a thinker as Spi vak, the complex maintenance of a "condition of perpetual potentiality" for thought is the highest vocation of art,57 and, incidentally, the only way it can really have political significance.
Through his silence, his maintenance-which is strictly irreducible to will-of potentiality, K figures the never-to-be-eliminated ethico-political apo 
